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Abstract
Constructive ZF + full separation is shown to be equiconsistent with Second Order Arithmetic.
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1. Introduction
CZF, Constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel Set Theory, is an axiomatization of set theory in intuitionistic logic strong
enough to do much standard mathematics yet modest enough in proof-theoretical strength to qualify as constructive.
Based originally on Myhill’s CST [10], CZF was first identified and named by Aczel [1–3]. Its axioms are:
• Pairing: ∀x, y ∃z ∀w w ∈ z ↔ (w = x ∨ w = y).
• Union: ∀x ∃y ∀z z ∈ y ↔ ∃w(w ∈ x ∧ z ∈ w).
• Extensionality: ∀x, y x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y).
• Set Induction (Schema): (∀x((∀y ∈ x φ(y)) → φ(x))) → ∀x φ(x).
• ∆0 Separation (Schema): ∀x ∃y ∀z z ∈ y ↔ (z ∈ x ∧ φ(z)), for φ a ∆0 formula.
• Strong Infinity: ∃x [(∅ ∈ x) ∧ (∀y ∈ x (y ∪ {y}) ∈ x) ∧ ∀z((∅ ∈ z ∧ ∀y ∈ z y ∪ {y} ∈ z) → z ⊆ x)].
• Fullness (AKA Subset Collection): ∀x, y ∃z ∀R (if R is a total relation from x to y then there is a total relation
R′ ∈ z from x to y such that R′ ⊆ R).
• Strong Collection (Schema): ∀x(∀y ∈ x ∃z φ(y, z) → ∃w (∀y ∈ x ∃z ∈ w φ(y, z) ∧ ∀z ∈ w ∃y ∈ x φ(y, z)).
Among Aczel’s accomplishments was an interpretation of CZF, and various extensions thereof, in Martin-Lo¨f type
theory, which established CZF as a predicative theory. As it turns out, CZF is proof-theoretically equivalent with
Martin-Lo¨f type theory ML1V, as well as KP (Kripke–Platek admissible set theory), ID (inductive definability), and a
host of other identified theories. Such theories can arguably be considered to be the limit of predicative mathematics,
allow for a philosophical justification as being constructive, and are in any case very much weaker proof-theoretically
than ZF. For an overview, references, and some proofs, see [11].
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It is a natural enough question to ask about the strength of variants of CZF. Michael Rathjen conjectured that adding
full Separation to CZF elevates the theory’s strength from ID, which is a small fragment of Second Order Arithmetic,
to full Second Order Arithmetic. In this note, this conjecture will be shown to be correct.
What is the value of such a result? It is certainly nicer if a theory is shown to be weak, in that one can then
use that theory with fewer philosophical scruples. This is the case for instance in [2], see also [11], where it is
shown that adding certain choice principles to CZF does not change the proof-theoretic strength. Still, knowing that
CZF + full Separation has the strength of Second Order Arithmetic tells us at least that the former theory is not
predicative, providing a warning to the constructively minded mathematician not to work within it. In addition, the
exact determination of this strength provides independence results. For instance, Rathjen ([12], Prop. 7.12 (ii)) shows
that CZF + Power Set is proof-theoretically stronger than nth Order Arithmetic for all n, from which it follows that
CZF, being much weaker, does not prove Power Set. Similarly, it follows from the result in this paper that even with
the addition of full Separation, Power Set does not follow. (The latter result is re-proven model-theoretically in [8].)
None of this should be surprising. Both the main result of this paper and the consequences just cited were anticipated
by Rathjen (and perhaps others), and the ideas contained in the proof to follow are themselves mostly a reworking of
those found in [1] and [11]. Still, at least now the results are formally established.
By way of additional background, recent work on CZF and other intuitionistic set theories, often involving
categorical models, has been done by S. Awodey, C. Butz, N. Gambino, E. Griffor, A. Joyal, I. Moerdijk, E. Palmgren,
A.K. Simpson, Th. Streicher, and M. Warren. For an excellent overview and references, see [4] or [13].
2. Interpreting CZF + full Separation in Second Order Arithmetic
First we will work within Second Order Arithmetic with the Axiom of Choice (ACω) to prove the consistency of
CZF + full Separation. The Axiom of Choice in this context is the assertion that ∀n ∃X φ(n, X) → ∃X ∀n φ(n, Xn),
where Xn is the nth slice of X according to some recursive coding scheme. It is an old observation that the consistency
strength of Second Order Arithmetic is unchanged by the addition of ACω; see for instance [6].
Notation. Natural numbers will be used to stand for recursive functions, via some standard encoding. The variables
used for numbers in this context will be e, f, g, h, and variants thereof. It is assumed that the language in question has
a two-place function symbol App, which on inputs e and x returns the result of applying the eth recursive function to
x . For readability, this will be written as {e}(x). We will avail ourselves of λ-notation to describe recursive functions.
This means that if some recursive procedure P is given for producing an integer P(x), depending uniformly on
an input integer x , then λx .P(x) will stand for an integer e such that {e}(x) = P(x). We also assume the choice
of a distinguished recursive tupling function, 〈 〉, with recursive arity function and recursive projection functions
(−)i , i ∈ ω. Vector notation a will be used to denote tuples, i.e. a is an abbreviation for 〈a0, . . . , an〉. Concatenation
of tuples is given by : a  b = 〈a0, . . . , an, b0, . . . , bm〉. If aˆ is an integer then a  aˆ is taken as shorthand for
a  〈aˆ〉, and similarly for aˆ  a. If X is a collection of tuples, then a  X = {a  b | b ∈ X}. Also, let a X be
{b | a  b ∈ X}. If a = 〈a〉, then 〈a〉  X and 〈a〉X will often be abbreviated as a  X and a X respectively. (Note
that a X might well be non-trivial even if a ∈ X , as X might contain only proper extensions of a.)
The proof will be via a realizability interpretation. By way of terminology, we will refer to certain reals in the
model of arithmetic as representing or being sets in the model of CZF. A real is itself a set of integers. In order to
avoid confusion as to whether any given object is claimed to be a set of integers in the given model of arithmetic or to
be a CZF-set, the word “set” will be reserved exclusively for the latter, the former being referred to as collections of
integers or, more simply, reals.
Under this interpretation, a set is given by a non-empty real S, consisting only of tuples, which forms a tree, and
which moreover is well-founded:
∀X[(X ⊆ S ∧ ∀a ∈ S(∀a  aˆ ∈ S a  aˆ ∈ X → a ∈ X)) → X = S].
(Any X satisfying the condition in the antecedent will be called inductive. Since inductivity is, strictly speaking,
dependent on the choice of ambient real S, sometimes for clarity such an X will be described as inductive relative to
S.) The idea is that the members of S are given by integers a such that 〈a〉 ∈ S, a’s members are given by integers b
such that 〈a, b〉 ∈ S, and so on. The property of being a set, denoted as Set(S), is Π 11 -definable.
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Lemma 2.0.1. If Set(S) and a ∈ S then Set(aS).
Proof. Suppose X ⊆ aS is inductive: ∀b ∈ aS(∀b  bˆ ∈ aS b  bˆ ∈ X → b ∈ X). We must show that X = aS .
Let X+ = (a  X) ∪ (S\(a  aS)). We claim that also X+ is inductive (relative to S). To see this, suppose that,
for a given b, for all bˆ such that b  bˆ ∈ S, b  bˆ ∈ X+. If b does not extend a then b ∈ S\(a  aS) ⊆ X+. If
b does extend aS , say b = a  c, then, if c  bˆ ∈ aS, b  bˆ ∈ S. By the hypothesis on b, b  bˆ ∈ X+; hence
c  bˆ ∈ X . Since X is inductive, c ∈ X , which yields b ∈ X+. Hence X+ is inductive. Since Set(S), X+ = S.
To finish up, if b ∈ aS , then a  b is in S, and hence also in X+. Since a  b could not enter X+ via the second
clause (in X+’s definition), it must have entered via the first: a  b ∈ (a  X). That means b ∈ X , i.e. aS ⊆ X . 
The realizability relation is defined recursively as follows:
• e  X ∈ S ↔ e1  X = eS0 ∧ 〈e0〉 ∈ S,
• e  S = T ↔ (∀〈a〉 ∈ S {e0}(a)  aS ∈ T ) ∧ (∀〈b〉 ∈ T {e1}(b)  bT ∈ S),
• e  φ ∨ ψ ↔ (e0 = 0 ∧ e1  φ) ∨ (e0 = 1 ∧ e1  ψ),
• e  φ ∧ ψ ↔ (e0  φ) ∧ (e1  ψ),
• e  φ → ψ ↔ ∀ f ( f  φ → {e}( f )  ψ),
• e  ∀Xφ(X) ↔ ∀X (Set(X) → e  φ(X)),
• e  ∃Xφ(X) ↔ ∃X (Set(X) ∧ e  φ(X)).
(As is standard, φ ↔ ψ is an abbreviation for φ → ψ ∧ ψ → φ, and ¬φ for φ → ⊥, where it follows by omission
from the above that nothing realizes ⊥.)
Although intuitionistically the Levy hierarchy of Σn and Πn formulas does not work as in the classical case, we
will still have use of the classical Levy rank of a formula. In the following, the assertion “φ is Σn (resp. Πn)” is to be
understood as giving φ’s classical rank, even when φ is intended and used as an intuitionistic formula. The reason for
this is that the relation “e  φ” is Σ 1n+1 (resp. Π 1n+1) for φ a Σn (resp. Πn) formula (classically), uniformly in e and
φ. This fact follows easily from the inductive definition of .
We now show that under this interpretation all of the axioms of CZF are valid.
1. Intuitionistic logic
That all of the (standard) realizability interpretations satisfy the axioms and inference rules of intuitionistic
logic is by now well understood. For examples and details, see for instance [5] or [9]. (Thanks to the referee for
relaying the information that in the latter the proof of the closure lemma seems to be mistaken. A correction is
reported to appear in [7].)
2. Equality axioms
Realizers need to be given for:
(a) ∀x x = x ,
(b) ∀x, y x = y → y = x ,
(c) ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ y = z → x = z,
(d) ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ z ∈ x → z ∈ y,
(e) ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ x ∈ z → y ∈ z.
(a) Unraveling the definitions, we need to find a realizer e so that, for i = 0, 1,
∀〈a〉 ∈ x {ei }(a)1  〈a〉x = {ei }(a)x0 .
With this in mind, let g be such that
{g}( f ) = 〈λx .〈x, f 〉, λx .〈x, f 〉〉.
Let e be a fixed point for g: e = {g}(e). e is as desired. (In clauses 9 and 10 below, e will be referred to as Id.)
(b) λe.〈e1, e0〉 is as desired.
(c)–(e) are of a similar flavor, and are left to the reader, who can also find proofs in [9]. Note that it follows by
induction on formulas that for all formulas φ there is a realizer for (x = y ∧ φ(x)) → φ(y), with (c)–(e) being
the base cases.
3. Extensionality
A realizer for this follows readily from the equality axioms above and the definitions of “e  S = T ” and
“e  X ∈ S”.
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4. Set induction
Given a formula φ, we need a realizer for
∀S(∀T ∈ S φ(T ) → φ(S)) → ∀Sφ(S).
Let e realize the antecedent. We need a realizer h(e) for the conclusion, recursively and uniformly in e; then
λe.h(e) would be the desired realizer. Let h(e) be {e}(λx .h(e)). By the Recursion Theorem, h(e) is a recursive
function, and by its definition is uniform in e. To see that h(e)  ∀Sφ(S), let S be a set; we need to show
that h(e)  φ(S). Let X be {a ∈ S | h(e)  φ(aS)}. By the assumption on e and definition of h(e), if
∀a  aˆ ∈ S a  aˆ ∈ X , then a ∈ X . By the well-foundedness of S, X = S. Hence 〈 〉 ∈ X , and h(e)  φ(〈 〉S).
5. Pairing
Given S and T , let U be (0  S) ∪ (1  T ). U is as desired.
6. Union
Given S, let T be {a | ∃a a  a ∈ S} ∪ {〈 〉}. T is as desired. (The reader might wonder why we have to
throw the empty sequence into T . Recall that, in order to represent a set, T must be non-empty, by definition. If S
represents the empty set, i.e. if S = {〈 〉}, then {a | ∃a a  a ∈ S} would be the empty set itself. In this case T as
actually defined would consist solely of 〈 〉, making⋃∅ = ∅, as desired.)
7. Strong infinity
We will define Sn inductively on n. Let S0 be {〈 〉}. Given Sm(m < n) let Sn be {m  a | m < n ∧ a ∈ Sm}.
Let Sω be {n  a | n ∈ ω, a ∈ Sn}. Sω is as desired.
8. Full separation
Given a set S and a formula φ, we need to show the existence of {a ∈ S | φ(a)}. Let Sφ be
{〈〈 f, a0〉, a1, . . . , an〉 | 〈a0, a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ S ∧ f  φ(aS0 )}. Sφ exists, by the definability of . It is also a
tree, almost, lacking merely the empty sequence. So let SetS,φ be Sφ ∪ {〈 〉}. We claim that SetS,φ is as desired.
To see that SetS,φ is a set, it remains only to check that it is well-founded. To this end, suppose X ⊆ SetS,φ is
inductive. It is easy to verify that for any a, a X is an inductive subset of aSetS,φ . Moreover, if a = 〈 〉 then there
is a b such that aSetS,φ = bS (for a = 〈〈 f, a0〉, a1, . . . , an〉, let b = 〈a0, a1, . . . , an〉). By the lemma earlier in this
section, bS is a set (i.e. is well-founded), so a X = bS and a X = aSetS,φ . This shows that Sφ ⊆ X . As a final step,
since X is inductive, SetS,φ ⊆ X .
It remains only to find a realizer for
∀x (x ∈ SetS,φ ↔ (x ∈ S ∧ φ(x)))
which is independent of S and SetS,φ. (The independence is necessary by the ∀ and ∃ clauses in the definition of
, which do not allow the realizer to access the sets chosen.) Choose any set x . Going from left to right, suppose
e  “x ∈ SetS,φ”. That means that e1  “x = eSetS,φ0 ” and 〈e0〉 ∈ SetS,φ. By the definition of SetS,φ , 〈e01〉 ∈ S,
eS01 = e
SetS,φ
0 , and e00  φ(eS01). This yields that 〈e01, e1〉  “x ∈ S”. Furthermore, from e00  φ(e
SetS,φ
0 ) and
e1  “x = eSetS,φ0 ”, a realizer g for φ(x) can be computed (uniformly in e00 and e1). The desired realizer for the
right hand side is then 〈〈e01, e1〉, g〉. The other direction is similar.
9. Subset collection
We will prove Fullness, which means finding an integer e such that
∀S, T ∃C e  “C ⊆ TotRel(S, T ) ∧ ∀U ∈ TotRel(S, T ) ∃V ∈ C V ⊆ U”
where TotRel(S, T ) is the collection of total relations from S to T . The choice of e will be facilitated by considering
the kinds of C’s we will ultimately be working worth (although e must not depend on the choice of C!). To
motivate the choice of C’s, suppose we have a realizer for U being such a total relation: f  ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈
T 〈x, y〉 ∈ U (neglecting here that every element in U must also come from S × T ). Unraveling the definitions
yields
∀x, g(g  “x ∈ S” → ∃y{ f }(g)01  “y = { f }(g)T00” ∧ { f }(g)11  “〈x, y〉 = { f }(g)U10”).
Letting Id be such that Id  ∀x x = x , and a so that 〈a〉 ∈ S, unraveling the definitions shows that
〈a, Id〉  aS ∈ S. Instantiating x with aS and g with 〈a, Id〉 produces
{ f }(〈a, Id〉)11  “〈aS, y〉 = { f }(〈a, Id〉)U10”.
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Let
f  S × T = {a ∈ U | ∃〈a〉 ∈ S a0 = { f }(〈a, Id〉)10} ∪ {〈 〉}.
From the definition, it would seem that f  S × T depends on U as well as f and S, and not on T , but actually
that is not the case, which is important in what follows (hence mention of U is suppressed in the notation). That
f  S × T does not depend on U can be seen from the role of f . Since f  ∀x ∈ S ∃y ∈ T 〈x, y〉 ∈ U , given
f, S, and T , we can determine U , or at least that part of U relevant to the definition of f  S ×T . (In a little detail,
feed 〈a, Id〉 to { f }, as a ranges through the members of S. { f } will produce the code for the corresponding y in T ,
as well as that for 〈a, y〉 in U . To get more information about U , meaning to get codes for members of members,
unravel the given a and the produced y.) So if the same f realizes that some V = U is also a total relation (from
S to T ), which is possible, the same f  S × T would be produced using V instead of U .
Let
ST = { f  a | ∃U f  “U ∈ TotRel(S, T )” ∧ a ∈ f  S × T } ∪ {〈 〉}.
S T will be the desired C . Toward this end, first we must verify that S T is a set. The most difficult part of this
is that it be well-founded. A member of S T is given by an f realizing that some U is a total relation. However,
there could be many different U ’s realized as a total relation by the same f . If we were to stick all those different
U ’s together, the result might not be well-founded. However, since f  S × T does not depend on U , this is not a
problem. The rest of showing that S T is a set is left to the reader.
Next we need a realizer for S T being a set of total relations. A member of S T is given by a realizer f that
some U is a total relation; that same f will work as such a realizer for the member of S T named by f (essentially
f  S ×T ). Also, given a U realized by f to be a total relation, we must produce a member V of S T and a realizer
that V ⊆ U . This V will be f  S × T ; its name in ST will be exactly U ’s realizer f ; and it is easy to realize the
necessary set inclusion, as f  S × T is literally a subset of U .
We leave to the reader the piecing together of the strands above for the determination of the realizer e showing
that S T is full. The fact that the procedure just sketched will work for any S and T shows that e can be chosen
independently of S and T . Observe that not only is S T full, it is also the set of functions from S to T .
10. Strong collection
Suppose
e  ∀X ∈ S ∃Y φ(X, Y ).
This implies that
∀〈a〉 ∈ S ∃Y {e}(〈a, Id〉)  φ(aS, Y ),
where Id  ∀x x = x . By the Axiom of Choice, for each such a let Ya be such a Y . Let Z be
{〈a, a0, . . . , an〉 | 〈a0, . . . , an〉 ∈ Ya} ∪ {〈 〉}.
Z is as desired.
3. Interpreting Second Order Arithmetic in CZF + full Separation
Within CZF + full Separation, let the natural numbers be given by the set posited by the Strong Infinity Axiom,
and let the sets of natural numbers be all subsets of said set. This is a model of Intuitionistic Second Order Arithmetic.
It is an already established result that the consistency strength of Second Order Arithmetic is unchanged by going
from intuitionistic to classical logic (see for instance [14], where this is shown via a double-negation translation).
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